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1 Introduction: basic assumptions 
and facts of experience
The utmost abstractions are the true weapons with 
which to control our thought of concrete fact (WHI-
TEHEAD, 1985, p. 41).
The great instigators of violence have encouraged 
themselves with the thought of how blind, mechani-
cal force is sovereign throughout the whole universe 
(WEIL, 2002, p. 11).
In his recent novel Solar, Ian McEwan re-counts an interesting episode in the ficti-tious life of Michael Beard, an emotionally 
dysfunctional Nobel Prize winning physicist 
whose carelessly lived life progressively disin-
tegrates. On his way to deliver a speech about 
global warming, Beard buys a packet of po-
tato crisps and boards a train, taking a seat 
opposite a tough-looking, shaven-headed, 
well-built young man. Beard opens the snack 
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or three crisps at length before noticing, with 
some discomfort, his fellow passenger sta-
ring at him. Shock follows when the stranger 
takes the liberty of reaching over into the pa-
cket, taking a crisp and flagrantly proceeding 
to eat it. Both men remain impassive despite 
the affectivity at play, and stare unblinkingly 
into one another’s eyes. Beneath these mas-
culine masks, however, McEwan describes how 
Beard’s feelings fluctuate between fear and an-
ger as he imagines, first, his imminent physical 
defeat, second, an unfathomable scene of pos-
sible seduction, and third, the possibility that 
he might be confronting a dangerous ‘psychia-
tric case’. He decides to take another crisp and 
the man does the same, this time taking two. 
This scene is repeated until, in a gesture Beard 
interprets as the final insult, the stranger picks 
up the packet, offers the obese physicist the 
last two crisps, and disposes of the empty bag. 
Beard, despite his evident physical inferiori-
ty, will not be bullied. Throwing caution to the 
wind, he defiantly picks up the young man’s 
bottle of water, opens it, and drinks the con-
tents, tossing the empty bottle back in a dis-
play of nonchalance. The man responds in an 
unexpectedly helpful way, by getting Beard’s 
luggage down from the overhead rack for him 
as the train arrives at its destination. After lea-
ving the train Beard discovers that, in fact, his 
crisps are still in his jacket pocket, unopened.
This little scene neatly illustrates how ‘ab-
stractions’ control our thought of ‘concrete 
fact’. Beard’s basic working assumption had 
been that the crisps belonged to him, and this 
assumption turned out to be false: they be-
longed to the young man all along. The scene 
clarifies how each of the empirical particulars 
experienced and expressed by both men during 
that short stretch of time had been patterned 
and shot-through by Beard’s basic assumption. 
Not just the actions, but also the fleeting and 
unstable feelings of shock, indignation, anger, 
fear and sympathy that we can now so easily 
imagine both men feeling (in a more or less 
‘symmetrical’ way) were concrete facts, but 
the abstract assumption was an active ingredi-
ent in their reality: a decisive factor determin-
ing the process of concrescence through which 
these facts of experience became concrete, 
and fed-forward into the next occasion of ex-
perience. On discovering the unopened packet, 
everything changes: a flash of new insight – 
deriving from the revised assumption – shows 
up the past stretch of time in a completely new 
light. The new assumption born from the de-
struction of the old enters as a fresh ingredient 
guiding the concrescence of the next experi-
ence, itself highly affective: ‘for the moment 
it felt like liberation, strangely like joy’ (2010, 
p. 127).
What applies in everyday life applies also in 
the life of science. At the beginning of his mag-
num opus Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, the 
psychologist Silvan Tomkins asserts that: ‘The 
most general assumption about the nature of 
its domain is the most critical single decision of 
a science’ (1962, p. 7). If affectivity is to be a 
useful concept, and is to help us in thinking the 
relation between society and technology, then 
it seems we must not neglect this critical deci-
sion concerning our ‘most general assumption’ 
(or what Whitehead calls our ‘utmost abstrac-
tion’). The Beard anecdote helps us to grasp 
why this is the case. It helps to show how our 
utmost abstractions are not separate from but 
participate in our experiences of concrete fact, 
sometimes providing the very pattern that 
gives shape, texture and intensity to those on-
going experiences. This perspective will doubt-
less appear paradoxical to those whose basic 
assumption is to oppose rather than identify 
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affectivity and abstraction, and hence to those 
who ultimately polarise something like ‘emo-
tion’ and ‘cognition’. Nevertheless, we start by 
assuming the critical value of our utmost ab-
stractions, and from this perspective it would 
not be sufficient to point out that affectiv-
ity refers to the dimension of feeling and to 
the experience and expression of emotions 
and passions such as joy, fear, shame, excite-
ment, hatred and love, including their micro-
-dynamics, expressions and phenomenology. 
Neither would it be enough to supplement this 
with broader questions concerning suggesti-
bility, social influence, imitation, imagination 
and contagion that, perhaps without conscious 
mediation, feed into emotions and passions, as 
well as wishes, desires and aspirations. These 
kinds of statements, although they might be 
quite correct and pertinent, remain relatively 
specific, leaving more general assumptions to 
work their influence implicitly. Are these emo-
tional experiences part of the real world or are 
they ‘merely’ subjective, and perhaps even ir-
rational, for instance? 
Tomkins does us the service – unusual for 
a psychologist – of making the general as-
sumptions relevant to his psychology of affect 
explicit. Tomkins’ work has been a major in-
fluence on a recent ‘turn to affect’ within scho-
larship in the humanities and social sciences 
– an influence rivaled, perhaps, only by the 
very different work of the French philosopher 
Deleuze (BROWN; STENNER, 2001; SEDGWI-
CK; FRANK, 1995; MASSUMI, 1995; CLOUGH; 
HALLEY, 2007; GRECO; STENNER, 2008; BLA-
CKMAN; VENN, 2010; GREGG; SEIGWORTH, 
2010). Given this influence, we will start our 
critical exploration of utmost abstractions con-
cerning affectivity by examining in some detail 
Tomkins’ most general assumption in the con-
text of his theory of affect. We will then argue 
that this most general assumption is characte-
rised by a fundamental instrumentalism, and 
that this characteristic is traceable to some 
of the changing configurations of technology, 
philosophy and politics in Western society. A 
critique of this instrumentalism opens the way 
for a revised general assumption concerning 
affectivity, based on process thinking. Our ar-
gument concerning affectivity builds on the 
thought of Heidegger, Canguilhem, Serres and 
Whitehead.
 
2 The most general assumption of 
Tomkins’ psychological theory of 
affect
A preliminary point to make is that Tomkins’ 
most general assumption does not pertain to 
all aspects of being, but to the subset he calls 
‘living systems’. The assumption that ‘life’ 
should be distinguished from non-life and that 
it can best be grasped as a system remains 
unexamined. We will return to the effects of 
this assumption shortly, because, like Beard’s 
original assumption, they pervade his account, 
in this case lending it a thoroughly instrumen-
talist, technological character. The primary 
characteristic of living systems, he states, is 
duplication, or self-replication in time and spa-
ce. The concept of duplication is thus Tomkins’ 
utmost abstraction. Duplication is not a ‘thing’ 
but an activity. Through its activities, a self-
-duplicating entity must transform and recruit 
materials and information from its environment 
to the end of the maintenance and repetition 
of its own material (energetic) and informatio-
nal self-identity. In classic cybernetic fashion, 
Tomkins thus distinguishes energy (which he 
uses interchangeably with ‘matter’) and in-
formation. He defines information in relation 
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to the patterning of matter into a recogniza-
ble and recurrent form: Information informs 
matter. To the extent that duplication reprodu-
ces some recognizable form, duplication thus 
always involves a combination of both matter/
energy and information. Compared to matter, 
however, information is relatively abstract. 
It follows from these assumptions that life 
is a complex cascade of systems and subsys-
tems composed of different mechanisms of du-
plication, which mechanisms – if they are also 
to be capable of persisting in time and space 
– must themselves be essentially duplicative. 
Many of the more obvious duplicating mecha-
nisms fall into the category we call ‘biological’. 
They concern the duplication of a species, the 
duplication of an organism as a whole, and the 
duplication of the various organs, cells and 
other components that compose an organism. 
At this biological level the material dimension 
is foremost, but information still plays a de-
cisive role. Hence the species duplicates itself 
over time by way of genetic mechanisms (on-
going protein production controlled by ‘codes’), 
and each individual must also be capable of 
ongoing self-duplication via, for example, cell 
division and maintenance. As a psychologist, 
however, Tomkins wishes to take seriously the 
idea of a distinctively psychological type of du-
plicating sub-system irreducible to the organic 
domain but whose relations to biology can ne-
vertheless be explained. These psychological 
mechanisms would then be of one piece with 
the complex cascade of systems that is life, but 
one could nevertheless draw a qualitative dis-
tinction between the organic and the psychic. 
The basis for this qualitative distinction is the 
differently weighted relevance of energetic 
and informatic aspects in the duplicative acti-
vity. Processes we call ‘psychological’, althou-
gh grounded in the materiality of physiological 
modes of duplication (the physical brain, for 
instance), involve duplicative mechanisms of a 
maximally informational and minimally mate-
rial kind. In this way we can see how the mas-
ter concept of duplication functions as a ‘third 
term’ supplying Tomkins with the common 
ground on which he can talk about – albeit wi-
thout the usual problematic polarization – what 
the vulgar amongst us would call ‘bodies’ and 
‘minds’.
So what is this unique type of maximally in-
formational ‘psychological’ duplicating system? 
Basically, it is what we call ‘consciousness’: the 
unfolding set of subjective experiences you, as 
a reader, are having right now, for instance. 
Tomkins insists that the material duplications 
occurring in the terminal we call ‘the brain’ 
undergo a ‘transmutation’ from unconscious 
message (proper to the duplicating activities 
of a nervous system complete with its synaptic 
chemical transmitters and electrical impulses) 
to conscious report (proper to the duplicating 
activities of conscious systems). The concept 
of transmutation suggests precisely this chan-
ge of modality in duplicating system (i.e. in 
duplicating mechanism and duplicated pro-
duct): a change of modality both in duplicating 
medium and duplicated form. If the biological 
duplicating machinery of the nervous system 
entails the organic processes associated with 
neural activity, then that of consciousness 
entails the psychic processes associated with 
activity with imagery (i.e. with whatever is 
consciously perceived). Conscious ‘reports’ are 
forms in the medium of self-created and inde-
ed self-creating imagery. This change of mo-
dality means, importantly, that it is not affe-
rent sensory information that is made directly 
‘available’ (via reports) to consciousness, but 
imagery. Conscious imagery can arise only out 
of conscious imagery and it can duplicate only 
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more conscious imagery. In this way the fact of 
consciousness is not taken to imply a realm of 
the subject (mind-stuff) distinct from a realm 
of objects (body-stuff): it is taken to imply a 
novel duplicating mechanism at play in nature 
or, better put, proper to a rarefied region of na-
ture. The human being qua conscious psycho-
logical being is basically a self-duplicating ima-
gery duplicator: ‘The world we perceive is a 
dream we learn to have from a script we have 
not written’ (1962: 13). 
Various psychological subsystems – which 
we can only hint at here – are presupposed 
by this system. First, Tomkins posits a central 
matching mechanism with its own processes 
of feedback responsible for duplicating ima-
gery out of transmuted sense data. A sensory 
message will only enter into the imagery of a 
conscious report on condition that it be ma-
tched by this central mechanism, and hence 
duplicated as one ingredient in a broader re-
port. Second, memory is then understood as 
a related mode of duplication (also operating 
with imagery) that presupposes consciousness 
to the extent that some aspects of whatever 
is duplicated in consciousness are necessari-
ly preserved for future use as conscious ima-
gery. Third, future directedness (‘will’) is in 
turn grasped in terms of a report emitted by 
and for this central mechanism that takes the 
form of a blueprint that Tomkins calls the Ima-
ge. The Image, as distinct from imagery, plays 
a special role as the blueprint or pattern for 
the feedback mechanisms at play in the pro-
cess of duplicating distinct types of imagery. 
In other words, in allowing the projection of a 
possibility that might be more or less realized 
(i.e. in supplying a blueprint or pattern), the 
Image embodies an end-state or target that 
shapes the possibility of conduct animated by 
conscious purpose. Through this self-fulfilling 
feedback mechanism, the Image can duplicate 
itself. The human being qua person is gover-
ned by a cybernetic feedback system in which 
information about the difference between an 
actual state and a predetermined (‘ideal’) state 
of consciousness is used to approximate that 
ideal state in practice. A creature thus endo-
wed can come to live for its feelings.
Although Tomkins does not use this term in 
this way, we suggest that, in the context of his 
theory, ‘affectivity’ constitutes a decisive vec-
tor mediating between the maximally informa-
tional duplications of conscious imagery and 
the maximally material duplications of organic 
processes. We suggest that affectivity therefo-
re functions as a kind of missing link capable of 
explaining the mysterious transmutation whe-
reby biological systems of duplication came 
to evolve that peculiar ‘slave’ psychological 
system (i.e. consciousness) that would gradu-
ally ‘master’ its organic progenitor (STENNER, 
2005). Affectivity, in this account, has its roots 
in organic processes but its flowers take the 
form of particular qualities that pervade the 
imagery of conscious experience, tingeing it 
with the intensity of value. In patterning expe-
rience into priorities of importance, affectivity 
‘borrows’ just enough from material processes 
to make immaterial processes matter. In using 
the term in this way we must insist that affec-
tivity is not unique to what Tomkins calls the 
‘affect system’, since it is also a prime charac-
teristic of what he calls the ‘drive system’. In 
unfolding his theory, Tomkins exploits a con-
trast between these two systems. We must 
now examine this contrast.
For Tomkins, the drive system evolved to 
motivate mobile organisms to undertake the 
behaviours required to find the things their 
duplication requires. The obvious examples 
concern food, drink and sexual partners. A 
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stationary organism like a tree, or a free-flo-
ating organism like a jelly-fish, arguably has 
no motivational need for an energetically ex-
pensive duplicating subsystem which dupli-
cates internally generated reports of imagery 
that push towards things like food and water 
consumption. Such creatures can normally 
rely upon a combination of genetically encoded 
information and a readily available continual 
influx of nutrients in order to duplicate their 
material parts. Such ‘material’ processes of 
duplication (including processes like photosyn-
thesis, cell reproduction food digestion, blood 
clotting, etc.), in other words, have no need of 
a subsidiary ‘conscious’ machinery of duplica-
tion. Tomkins suggests that such a need arises 
only when organisms are faced with a situa-
tion in which information that cannot be built 
into the organism in advance (e.g.genetically 
encoded) assumes vital importance. An orga-
nism that may need to travel long distances to 
find food (the whereabouts of which it cannot 
know in advance), for example, does require 
such motivation. For Tomkins, the drive system 
meets this need by generating signals with a 
high likelihood of becoming the conscious re-
ports we call experiences like thirst, hunger, 
sexual pleasure, and perhaps pain. The hunger 
drive, for instance, expresses itself in the ima-
gery of reports via a conscious experience of a 
rumbling belly and a salivating mouth. These 
signals not only beat ‘on the door of consciou-
sness’, but also goad the hungry creature into 
the requisite food-seeking activity by providing 
clear motivational indications of what is requi-
red and where to put it (1962, p. 31). The or-
ganism may not know exactly where to seek 
what they now feel they need, but they are at 
least motivated to seek. To return to our flower 
metaphor, what we are calling the affectivity 
of the drive is thus the way it affects the or-
ganism via a conscious report (the flower) of 
organic activity (the roots).
Although it might be primary in ‘lower’ ani-
mals, Tomkins suggests that in the case of 
human beings the drive system is superseded 
in motivational importance by an ‘affect sys-
tem’. Drives, he suggests, can be weak unless 
amplified by affects. What we might normally 
attribute to the strength of a ‘sex drive’, for 
instance, Tomkins suggests is in fact the pro-
duct of its amplification by specific affects such 
as excitement or enjoyment (or shame). The 
affect system is thus thought to have evolved 
because it met vital duplicative needs beyond 
the purview of the drive system, amplifying 
and supplementing drive functions to suit the 
requirements of an increasingly social species 
thrown into the challenging process of adap-
ting to multiple and changing habitats. Like 
drives, affects exploit ‘affectivity’ to make 
things matter to the affected consciousness, 
but they vastly expand the scope of what can 
matter. A creature endowed with affects, sug-
gests Tomkins, can be excited by novelty (and 
resistant to boredom), can enjoy the smile of a 
con-specific (and resist the experience of sha-
me in the face of disapproval), and can want 
to remain alive (and fear and resist threats to 
its life). 
Tomkins thus envisages an organically roo-
ted ‘affect system’ composed of a small number 
of distinguishable positive affects (such as ex-
citement and joy) neutral affects (e.g.startle) 
and negative affects (such as distress, fear, 
anger, disgust and shame). These affects are 
taken to be innate and biologically grounded 
in the sense that each is associated with its 
own characteristic pattern of biological activi-
ty, especially involving the face, and – in the-
ory at least – its own neurological trigger for 
innate activation. As with drives, the principal 
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role of their organic functionings is that para-
dox we are calling affectivity: it is to become 
conscious (to enter as an ingredient into a self 
duplicating stream of imagery); it is to supply 
distinctive qualities which pervade and enrich 
the imagery of conscious reports with informa-
tion that is inherently motivational. One of the 
key qualities we experience when ashamed, 
for example, concerns the ‘flower’ of a cons-
cious feeling of our face as it engorges with the 
blood of a blush drawn up, as it were, from its 
embodied roots. We might say that the infor-
mational dimension of affectivity, whether as-
sociated with ‘drives’ or ‘affects’, clings to and 
moves with the body. Tomkins thus contrasts 
such ‘motivating information’ with information 
provided by the senses, such as vision, which 
is motivationally neutral (unless amplified by 
affectivity). 
Affectivity here is an aesthetic characteristic 
that, in a basic sense, adds a quality of inherent 
acceptability (self-rewarding) or unacceptabili-
ty (self-punishing) to an experience. The affec-
tivity of drives and affects differs, however, in 
important respects. As with the brief example 
of hunger above, feelings associated with dri-
ves convey some quite specific information 
about the ‘where’, the ‘when’ and the ‘what’ 
of required conduct, suggesting that drives are 
tightly coupled to that which causes them and 
that which satisfies them (we are always hun-
gry ‘about’ food and eating behaviour typically 
reduces our hunger ‘signals’). Affects, by con-
trast, are relatively loosely coupled: we can be 
made angry by virtually anything, and there 
are multiple ways in which that anger might 
be assuaged. The downside of this is increased 
ambiguity and error, since the feelings as such 
do not tell us precisely what is happening, nor 
what to do about it. This cost is nevertheless 
outweighed by the advantage of considerable 
flexibility. Despite their ‘hard-wired’ biological 
provenance, affects can thus be flexibly trigge-
red by a range of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ events, 
and can remain open to the contingencies of 
learning and conscious control. These qualities 
make affectivity central to Tomkins’ duplicative 
conception of consciousness since affects feed 
into the Images or blueprints for action, thou-
ght and decision. That is to say, each affective 
experience embodies the possibility of a lure 
for ‘better’ feelings yet to come. Crudely put, 
we aim (thanks to an end-state embodied in an 
Image) to duplicate good feelings by repeating 
the encounters associated with them, and to 
eliminate occasions of negative affect. 
The child chased and bitten by a strange 
dog, for example, no more needs to learn the 
blend of panic, distress and fear that might 
be associated with this dangerous encounter 
than she needs to learn to feel the pain asso-
ciated with the tissue damage. The heightened 
consciousness and potent imagery of this dis-
tressing affective scene – assuming it is not so 
potent as to provoke repression – is likely to 
render it highly memorable to her. Subsequent 
encounters with dogs may then take on the 
affective qualities of the prior scene, becoming 
co-assembled with it into the broader unity 
that Tomkins calls a ‘script’ (i.e. an organised 
set of affective scenes). Such a ‘dog phobia 
script’ serves as an Image or blueprint, feeding 
the general assumptions (utmost abstractions) 
that are used to shape conduct relevant to fu-
ture occasions (e.g.‘avoid strange dogs!’). In 
this way, affectivity affords the construction of 
a ‘bridge’ from an actual scene of experience 
to a potential future scene by way of a virtual 
memory. It would thus play a key role in the 
duplication of the imagery of consciousness 
which itself plays a key role in the duplication 
of the organism and its species. 
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3 Affectivity, technology, society
So far we have stressed the relevance of 
utmost abstractions to engagement with con-
crete specifics (including affective encounters) 
and we have looked at the most general as-
sumption of one influential theory of affect. We 
have identified ‘duplication’ as Tomkins’ most 
general assumption and shown how it con-
trols and pervades the specific details of his 
theory, in which life in general is understood 
as a functional system defined by duplication. 
In what follows we wish to explore this ut-
most abstraction in more detail. We will start 
by saying that Tomkins’ utmost abstraction is 
self-consciously machinic in character, in that 
it posits living systems as complex interlocking 
series of devices ‘normed’ to meet functional 
requirements through natural selection (i.e. by 
correlations between reproductive success and 
adaptation). 
In fact, Tomkins is quite frank about the de-
cisive way his theory was influenced by posing 
the following question: ‘How should one devise 
an automaton to stimulate the essential cha-
racteristics of the human?’ (p. 116). Such an 
automaton, if it is to be a ‘formidable rival’ of 
its creator, would need the technical equipment 
of a drive system and an affect system to moti-
vate it to learn and to ‘examine ways and me-
ans of maximizing its own self-rewarding res-
ponses and minimizing its own self-punishing 
responses’. Through adjusting these systems, 
the designer could then ‘interest the machine 
in its own self-preservation’ and ‘interest such 
a machine in other machines like itself’. Here it 
is worth quoting at length what we might call 
‘Tomkins’ dream’ (since to be internally con-
sistent, Tomkins must reflexively view his own 
imagery as a dream he learned to have from a 
script he had not written):
The fragmentation and amplification of man’s 
capacities by automata has been the rule: the 
microscope was a visual amplifier, the radio a 
speech and hearing amplifier, the steam sho-
vel a muscle amplifier and the computer an 
intelligence amplifier. The next and final de-
velopment of simulation will be an integrated 
automaton – with microscopic and telescopic 
lenses and sonar ears, with atomic powered 
arms and legs, with a complex feedback cir-
cuitry powered by a generalizing intelligence 
obeying equally general motives having the 
characteristics of human affects. Societies of 
such automata would reproduce and care for 
the young automata. How friendly or hostile 
to man they might become would depend on 
the design of the relative thresholds of these 
two affects and the conditions under which 
their circuitry was activated (p. 119-20).
In drawing attention to the technological 
character of the most basic assumption struc-
turing Tomkins’ theory of affect we are begin-
ning to address, from a particular perspecti-
ve, some of the relations between affectivity, 
technology and society. In particular, we wish 
to invite reflection on the extent to which ut-
most abstractions about affectivity are shaped 
by – and in turn lend shape to – the changing 
forms of technology and scientific thought of 
the society in which they are articulated. New 
developments in techno-science will thus be 
associated with new ways of thinking about, 
acting upon, and perhaps experiencing, affec-
tivity. We propose that, considered in the his-
torical long term, these ways are patterned 
by utmost abstractions that become increa-
singly instrumentalist in character, until living 
systems as such, including their capacity for 
affectivity, come to be conceived as essentially 
tools at the service of their own duplication. 
To secure this point we will briefly distinguish 
four historical configurations of technology and 
affectivity. 
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3.1 The helmsman and the machine
The notion of a helmsman navigating a sai-
ling ship, or indeed a charioteer managing the 
horses tethered to his wheeled chariot, is a 
common trope for understanding affectivity in 
the literature of classical Greece, and it con-
tinues with only minor variations throughout 
the medieval and early modern period (GRAN-
GE, 1962). Plato used this trope, not just as a 
metaphor of political government, but also as 
a model for understanding the direction and 
government of ‘oneself’, including one’s pas-
sions (see FOUCAULT, 2005, p. 248-9). In the 
Platonic and Stoic literature passions are of-
ten understood as ‘storms’ (or animals) that, 
where possible, should be subdued by the re-
ason-based skill of the helmsman since they 
are potentially fatal to the tranquility sought 
as the ideal state of being. Although there is 
evidently a reference to technology in these 
ways of conceiving affectivity, this reference 
differs markedly from Tomkins’ assumption of 
an essentially mechanized nature and human 
nature. The human agency of the helmsman 
or charioteer is in this case distinct both from 
the technology in use (ship, chariot), and from 
the forces of nature ‘at balance’ in these tech-
nological assemblages (gusts of wind, surging 
tides, the unpredictable inclinations of power-
ful animals). Whether passions and affections 
are celebrated for their usefulness as healthy 
gales, or vilified as ship-wrecking forces, they 
are grasped in relation to a balance of forces 
involving a contrast between those things whi-
ch can be controlled by a human agent and 
those things which are outside of human con-
trol. In short, neither the passions themselves 
nor the agents struggling to control them are 
construed as inherently technical, rather ‘the 
technical’ serves merely to mediate in a man-
ner that enhances the powers of the helmsman 
vis-à-vis the forces of nature. The technological 
reference in these classical assumptions about 
affectivity is thus situated and grounded in a 
broader, non-technical context: a context go-
verned by quite different ‘utmost abstractions’. 
In this classical context, the ultimate genera-
lities are precisely not reducible to the techni-
cal practicalities that might be put to work in 
efforts to achieve them. They typically take the 
form of an art of life oriented towards ideals 
such as goodness, beauty and truth (HADOT, 
1995). The practical reason associated with te-
chnology (i.e. means-ends reason oriented to 
an immediate method of action) is thus made 
subservient to a form of reason devoted to ar-
ticulating a ‘bigger picture’ of ultimate purpo-
ses. Following Whitehead (1929/1958, p. 10) 
we might say that the fox-like reason of Ulys-
ses is made subservient to the god-like reaso-
ning of Plato. 
3.2 The ghost in the machine1
Although it undoubtedly became increasin-
gly sophisticated and varied, the type of tech-
nology familiar to Plato did not change funda-
mentally until the late 18th Century. Until then, 
devices like wheels, levers, cogs, sails and so 
forth were essentially deployed to harness, 
transmit and enhance ‘natural forces’, the most 
obvious being horse power, water power, wind 
power or person power (see SERRES, 1992). 
A lever, for instance, serves to amplify human 
muscle power; a collar and harness serve to 
transmit the strength of a horse to the pulling 
of a wagon with its axels and wheels; a sail, 
properly controlled with mast and rigging, cap-
1 We borrow this phrase from Gilbert Ryle who used it to des-
cribe Descartes’ dualism in The Concept of Mind (1949).
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tures the wind to move a ship, and so forth. 
By contrast, natural philosophy did go throu-
gh some radical transformations, notably in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, and particularly 
under the influence of figures like Bacon, Ga-
lileo, Descartes and Newton. Although the rup-
ture with the Christianized Aristotelianism and 
neo-Platonism of the medieval period can be 
overstated, these developments constituted a 
shock to those medieval theories responsible 
for articulating the most general assumptions 
concerning the ‘bigger picture’ of human exis-
tence with its divinely ordained ultimate aims. 
With respect to affectivity, St Augustine of Hi-
ppo and St Thomas Aquinas had offered par-
ticularly influential medieval doctrines of the 
affections, and the most general assumptions 
of these doctrines were now challenged and 
modified (see GARDINER, et al., 1937; DIXON, 
2004). Consistent with this older tradition, 
Descartes continued to place special importan-
ce on the possession of a ‘soul’ and used this 
to draw a distinction between the natural world 
(including animals) and humans on the basis 
that the latter possess souls. This continuity is 
also expressed in the fact that Descartes re-
currently adopts the image of the rational soul 
as pilot or helmsman of a bodily ‘vessel’ sub-
ject to passions likened to turbulent weather 
conditions, stormy waters, strong winds, and 
so forth (although, importantly, in the Medi-
tations he also points to the limits of this me-
taphor with respect to grasping the different 
substantial natures at play). But Descartes 
also proposed the radical idea that all natu-
ral things, including the living bodies of plants, 
animals and humans, are to be understood as 
machines created by God:
We see clocks, artificial fountains, water mills 
and other such machines which, although 
man made, seem to move of their own accord 
in various ways; but I am supposing this ma-
chine [the human body] to be made by the 
hands of God, and so I think you may reaso-
nably think [of it as] exhibiting more artistry 
than I could possibly ascribe to it (1985, cited 
in CANGUILHEM, 1992, p. 53).
Here we see an important subversion of the 
classical distinction between physis (the con-
cept translated into Latin as natura) and tech-
ne. The Greeks had used these terms to dis-
tinguish between phenomena that grow out of 
themselves in a self-creative self-bringing-for-
th (physis), and phenomena that are ‘brought 
forth’ not out of themselves, but by a crafts-
person. By contrast, in what Whitehead (1948, 
p. 166) calls the ‘physical synthesis’ inaugura-
ted by Galileo and completed by Newton, the 
natural world of physis is taken to be a form 
of techne. Artificial things are then identified 
with nature rather than contrasted with it. As 
Descartes put it:
It is certain that all the rules of mechanics 
belong to physics, to the extent that all ar-
tificial things are thereby natural. Since, for 
example, when a watch counts the hours, by 
using the cogs from which it is made, this is 
no less natural for it than it is for a tree to 
produce fruit (1985, cited in CANGUILHEM, 
1992, p. 59).
This mode of thought feeds into Descar-
tes’ account of ‘the passions’. Here, affectivi-
ty (qua the passions) plays a mediating role 
between the substances of extension (passive 
physical machinery) and thought (the divine 
active principle). The passions are depicted 
as entirely passive perceptions of the active 
desires of the will, and hence something the 
mind should strive to gain dominion over. Note 
that in Descartes the assumption of a mecha-
nistic universe flows directly from an utmost 
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abstraction concerning the nature of God: na-
mely that God is effectively a divine mechanic 
with motives beyond our comprehension. Na-
ture shows up very differently on the basis of 
this reconfiguration. As in Beard’s assumption 
that the crisps he had opened were owned by 
him, the modern settlement gives the ‘ghost’ 
rightful ownership of the ‘machine’. Once we 
are authorized to model ourselves after the di-
vine mechanic, our divine ‘I’ – in its splendid 
isolation as a distinct non-material substan-
ce – is effectively entitled to adopt an entirely 
instrumental and exploitative attitude to what 
is now cast as the extended machinery of na-
ture. Lacking any purpose of its own, nature 
is now merely a means to serve human pur-
poses.2 The affective scene – of detachment 
from nature, soon to be followed by Romantic 
nostalgia – is thus set for the development of 
a new epoch of technology and technological 
domination, and a new socio-historical chapter 
of human affectivity. This new epoch is the one 
Heidegger critically addressed in The question 
concerning technology (1977).
3.3 The fire in the machine
Heidegger’s critique refers to what he calls 
the ‘modern machine-power technology’ that 
developed only late in the 18th century, and 
that he describes by way of a contrast with 
an earlier modality. The sails of a windmill, he 
points out ‘do indeed turn with the wind; they 
are left entirely to the wind’s blowing’ (1977, 
p. 14). Unlike a modern coal or nuclear power 
station, the windmill ‘does not unlock energy 
from the air currents in order to store it’. A 
peasant might cultivate a field using horse and 
2 This point echoes an argument long made by eco-feminists, 
most notably Merchant (1980).
plough, but he does not challenge the soil of 
the land to put out coal and ore for stockpiling, 
as modern technology does. The old wooden 
bridge that joined bank to bank for so many 
years let the Rhine be the river it should be. 
By contrast, the modern hydroelectric plant 
extracts from its current a supply of electricity 
to be dispatched through a network of cables, 
and converts the river itself into something at 
our command: a water power supplier whose 
essence now derives from the power station. 
Even the old forester felling timber along the 
same forest path is, under modern technology, 
‘commanded by profit-making in the lumber 
industry… and made subordinate to the orde-
rability of cellulose’ (1977, p. 18). Modern te-
chnology, for Heidegger, is that which puts to 
nature the ‘unreasonable demand’ that it sup-
ply energy: it ‘sets upon’ nature as ‘standing 
reserve’. 
What is distinctive about this modern mo-
dality of technology, in short, is that it does not 
rely on merely transmitting the external (‘na-
tural’) force of muscles, wind and water, but 
invents, operates with and contains its own po-
wer source, transforming ‘nature’ as it does so 
(SERRES, 1992). This is the technology of the 
industrial revolution, technology with an engi-
ne: a combustion engine. Although this fire-
-based technology has ancient origins, its real 
possibilities were unleashed only after James 
Watt used a condenser to optimize thermo-
dynamic efficiency in the years between 1763 
and 1775. The early coal-powered steam engi-
nes that followed could dispense with horses in 
favour of ‘horse power’: a power source based 
on controlling explosive pressure and extreme 
heat (see SERRES, 1992). By way of this new 
technology the feudal landscape was transfor-
med into the industrial city; the determinate 
laws of Newtonian mechanics give way to the 
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stochastic chaos of thermodynamics; orderly 
biological taxonomy was thrown into the blind 
future of evolutionary time; and the pastoral 
landscapes of a Constable became the hazy 
clouds and red fires of a Turner. 
It is no accident that the semantics of affec-
tivity also melt down and transform in the 
crucible of this epoch. It is precisely during 
the late 18th and early 19th century that the 
terminology undergoes a marked shift from 
a vocabulary of affection, sentiment and pas-
sion towards an increasingly widespread use 
of the term ‘emotion’ (DANZIGER, 1997; DI-
XON, 2004). This shift in terminology, we sug-
gest, reflects the replacement of the Cartesian 
‘ghost in the machine’ with the ‘motivational’ 
energy of a motor. It goes hand in hand with 
a gradual but systematic erosion of the idea 
that human conduct might be governed by the 
teleological reasoning of a subject possessed 
with something like a will. Following Hutche-
son, Hume, for example, rose to notoriety by 
insisting that reason alone can never motivate 
any action. Although it was hardly used at the 
time and would have been strangely unfamiliar 
to his readers, Hume frequently used the word 
‘emotion’ in this context, exploiting its physical 
association with motion to stress its centrality 
to the motivation of action (DANZIGER, 1997, 
p. 40). By the early 19th Century this new con-
cept was well established, and indeed was core 
to the medically oriented psychology of Tho-
mas Brown in which ‘emotion’ designated all 
non-intellectual states of mind (see DIXON, 
2004). As we also see in La Mettrie’s L’Homme 
Machine (1748), these thinkers no longer con-
sidered it necessary to exempt ‘the soul’ from 
the category of natural machine. 
When understood as emotion at this junc-
ture, then, affectivity comes to figure preci-
sely as a more or less primitive energy sour-
ce at the organic core of the human animal/
machine: as the fire, steam and pressure of a 
hydraulic thermodynamic system, for instance. 
Given the eroded plausibility of teleological re-
asoning, this imagery replaces the technically 
mediated balancing act of passivity and acti-
vity that had been central to the passions and 
affections. This move is central to the develop-
ment of psychology as a scientific discipline. It 
is clearly expressed, for instance, in the work 
of Alexander Bain (1811-1877), who talked of 
a central organismic energy source that does 
not require the application of ‘outward stimu-
lants’. This Bain conceived as ‘a central fire 
that needs no stirring from without’ (1977, p. 
329 and 305). It seems that, by the end of the 
19th Century, this notion was shared by theo-
rists with otherwise divergent programmes of 
research, including Hughlings Jackson’s evo-
lutionary neurology, Freud’s patently hydraulic 
psychodynamic model, and James’ psychology. 
In each of these cases, parallels were drawn 
between the emotional energies of individuals 
and the social energies of populations, both of 
which were considered subject to technological 
intervention. Hence in The Energies of Men, Ja-
mes (1914: 14 and 15) surmises that a nation 
filled with individuals ‘energizing below [their] 
maximum’ because their ‘fires are damp’ will 
be inferior to a ‘nation run at higher pressure’. 
The technological origins of the concept of ‘dri-
ve’ (which came to dominate psychology in the 
1930s) are made quite explicit by one of the in-
ventors of this concept: ‘I am sure I did not de-
rive the word from any previous psychologist. I 
got it from mechanics. A machine has a mecha-
nism, such that if it is put in motion it operates 
in a certain way; but it must be driven in order 
to move. The “drive” of a machine is the supply 
of energy that puts it in motion’ (WOODWOR-
TH, 1918, cited in DANZIGER, 1997, p. 119). 
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3.4 The meme in the machine
Technological innovations have come thi-
cker and faster than ever over the last century, 
but perhaps the most significant among them 
was the development of the information and 
communications technology and theory asso-
ciated with the digital computer. With respect 
to assumptions about affectivity, this returns 
us to Tomkins’ cybernetic theory of affect, 
which was part of a ‘cognitive revolution’ 
that transformed the discipline of psychology 
around the 1960s by providing scientifically 
acceptable models of human mentality as in-
formation processing. We have seen, for ins-
tance, how Tomkins combines notions of drive 
(associated with the ‘fire in the machine’ con-
figuration) with the notion of a maximally in-
formational duplicating mechanism associated 
with consciousness. It is not difficult to link this 
to a contrast between a steam train (maximum 
energy, minimum information) and a computer 
(which needs just a small amount of electrici-
ty to power its massive informatic capacity). 
Later, highly influential cognitive theories of 
emotion would come to practically ignore the 
energetic dimension, giving the topic of emo-
tion a distinctly ‘cool’ character (e.g.ARNOLD, 
1960; SCHACHTER; SINGER, 1962; MANDLER, 
1975). No longer preoccupied with the contain-
ment and productive channelling of massive 
internal forces, cognitive theories turn instead 
to a ‘constructivist’ concern with modes of ap-
praisal and communication of meaning. Scha-
chter & Singer’s (1962) famous ‘two factor’ 
theory, for instance, involves a double act of 
energy and information that stages the domi-
nance of the latter. The dumb but hot energy of 
physiological arousal (supposedly simple and 
undifferentiated) is played against the smart 
and cool informational business of cognition, 
to argue that specific emotions are differentia-
ted by attributions from the cognitive system. 
From here it is a short step to the social cons-
tructionism of Averill and others, who point out 
that the content of the information at play is 
largely second-hand and collectively shaped.
4 Political machines: 1642
This historical sketch of four distinguisha-
ble configurations of technology and affectivity 
serves to illustrate the sense in which Tomkins’ 
theory is indeed like a dream he learned to 
have from a script he had not written. Tomkins 
may have invented the details of his theory, but 
the utmost abstraction in terms of which these 
details are framed is one that he inherited, as 
the provisional culmination of a long develop-
ment in Western thought and society. We have 
suggested that this utmost abstraction subor-
dinates the thought of all concrete facts to a 
form of instrumental or means-end rationality. 
In this framework, the value of nature and of 
all things in nature is no longer conceived as 
intrinsic or as a possible object of philosophi-
cal speculation; it is given rather empirically, to 
the extent that something can perform a func-
tion deemed useful. Ultimately, as we see in 
Tomkins, the definition of living beings as such 
is one that foregrounds their ultimate function: 
they are conceived as tools at the service of 
their own duplication. At this juncture it is im-
portant to give due recognition to the political 
dimension at play in the historical consolida-
tion of the instrumentalist utmost abstraction. 
We wish to suggest that this abstraction was 
not simply a philosophical and narrowly tech-
nological concern, but that it came to assume 
fundamental political importance. It may inde-
ed be considered the conceptual cornerstone 
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of the political machinery of the modern epoch. 
Machiavelli’s influence looms large here, but we 
suggest that the laying of this cornerstone had 
to wait upon the 17th Century developments in 
natural philosophy sketched earlier. Although 
all such datings are ultimately arbitrary (see 
WHITEHEAD, 1948), we propose the year 1642 
to symbolize this development. 
1642 was the year of Galileo’s death and 
of Newton’s birth, but it was also the year in 
which Civil War broke out in England. In 1642 
Thomas Hobbes was living in exile in Paris in-
cubating ideas for his Leviathan (1651). The-
se ideas effected an instrumentalist integra-
tion of Body, Man and State conceived in the 
light of the new physical doctrine of motion. 
A meditation on affectivity was fundamental 
to Hobbes’ proposed integration of physical, 
psychological and political law, and would re-
main fundamental thereafter. Inspired by the 
accounts of the passions offered by Aristotle 
and Thucydides, but informed by the mathe-
matical method of modern physical science, 
Hobbes reasoned that it is only through ac-
curate knowledge of the passions, sentiments 
and affections that one can work out the best 
way of ordering social relations (the right way 
of living) and thus the optimal form of Sta-
te. Although the parallels with Tomkins should 
not be overstated, it is notable that Hobbes 
preempts Tomkins, not just in proposing that 
human beings should think of their bodies, 
their affections and passions and their selves 
as machines (for Hobbes, unlike Descartes, 
human being is graspable in its entirety as 
a force of nature), but also in stressing the 
fundamental relevance of self-perpetuation in 
time. Hobbes’ equivalent to Tomkins’ most ge-
neral assumption of duplication is, as we shall 
see, the utmost abstraction of self-preserva-
tion. Hobbes’ work is precisely about making 
self-preservation the fundamental assumption 
– the common denominator (literally, the in-
terest held in common by all) informing the 
organization of social order by way of a natu-
ralistic and instrumentalist self-understanding 
of human nature. 
In brief, for Hobbes, human beings are phy-
sical organisms undergoing bodily motion gui-
ded, where possible, by a will newly defined as 
an appetite, namely, ‘the last appetite on deli-
berating’ (Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter 
6). Again, as with Tomkins, motivation is a key 
concept, but motivation defined strictly in rela-
tion to affective aversions and desires oriented 
to maximize pleasure and to minimize displea-
sure. Reason is in turn naturalized and unders-
tood in terms of the worldly calculations of a 
desire machine (see STENNER, 2004). Indeed, 
there is a strikingly Hobbesian feel to Tomkins’ 
proposals, cited above, that a social and hu-
man engineer must ‘interest the machine in its 
own self-preservation’ and ‘in other machines 
like itself’. Hobbes’ work is precisely about in-
teresting human machines in other human ma-
chines such that they might form a covenant to 
bond together in the generation of the societal 
mega-machine he called Leviathan. 
Leviathan, Hobbes stresses, is ‘that mortal 
god, to which we owe… our peace and defen-
ce’ (Part II, Chapter 17). Unlike an immortal 
God, this god shares our individual needs and 
desires for self-preservation, and hence self-
-preservation is the primary motive in Hobbes’ 
system. Indeed, it is so important that Hobbes 
redefines the very concept of natural right in 
its terms. Jus Naturale, after Hobbes, ‘is the 
liberty each man hath, to use his own power, 
as he will himself, for the preservation of his 
own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and 
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his 
own judgement, and reason, he shall concei-
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ve to be the aptest means thereunto’ (Part I, 
Chapter 14). 
It is, of course, this very natural right to 
be author of one’s own self-preservation that 
must be given up in the process of signing the 
covenant that generates Leviathan. Each sub-
ject must hand over their natural right to what 
then becomes authorized as the unchallenge-
able sovereign power: ‘I authorize and give up 
my right of governing myself, to this man, or 
to this assembly of men, on this condition, that 
thou give up thy right to him, and authorize 
all his actions in like manner’ (Part II, Chapter 
17). Self-preservation is thus the most general 
assumption because it is construed as the pri-
mary (if often hidden) motive. If the passions 
that come into play in pursuing our own indivi-
dual natural rights to self-preservation can be 
shown to lead inevitably to a chaos of uncon-
trolled violence (a ‘war of all against all’) then, 
paradoxically, our self-preservation in fact de-
pends upon giving up our natural right to self-
-preservation. That is to say, if we agree to 
define ourselves as self-preserving automata 
in this way, then we must will our subjection to 
the norms of a social body. 
It is striking that fear of death haunts the 
concept of self-preservation – fear of death in 
the chaos of the war of all against all, and fear 
of death at the sword of the sovereign in case 
of disobedience. It is only through fear of ex-
tinction that people can be brought face-to-fa-
ce with the self-evidence of the perpetual and 
pressing need for self-preservation. Strauss 
(1963, p. 128) calls this the ‘principle of fear’ 
and suggests that it is ‘in the movement from 
the principle of honour to the principle of fear 
[that] Hobbes’s political philosophy comes into 
being’. Aristocratic honour, from Hobbes’ pers-
pective, makes the mistake of putting the va-
lues of dignity and respect before the value of 
life, and hence poses an obstacle to any wil-
led subjection to a rational social order. In the 
name of avoiding fear we are lured towards the 
convenience proper to a life lived according to 
instrumental reason:
The condition of man in this life shall never be 
without inconvenience; but their happeneth 
in no commonwealth any great inconvenien-
ce, but what proceeds from the subjects’ di-
sobedience, and breach of those convenants, 
from which the commonwealth has its being 
(Part II, chapter 10).
Through such arguments, Hobbes himself 
claimed to have made a break with the whole 
prior tradition of political philosophy, and, ac-
cording to Strauss (1963, p. 1) it is ‘almost uni-
versally admitted that Hobbes marks an epoch 
in the history of natural law and of the theory 
of the state’. Strauss goes further and conclu-
des that Hobbes posed the fundamental ques-
tion of modern politics, such that this ‘moment 
was decisive for the whole age to come; in it 
the foundation was laid, on which the modern 
development of political philosophy is wholly 
based, and it is the point from which every at-
tempt at a thorough understanding of modern 
thought must start’ (1963, p. 5). Whether or 
not we accept this claim, it seems clear that it 
is through the application of the mathematical 
methods of Euclid and Galileo that Hobbes is 
able to claim a truly scientific form of politics 
(i.e. political science) capable of working out 
how to live rightly in the context of a rightly 
ordered society. After Hobbes, the State can no 
longer be considered an entity guaranteed by 
the will of a presiding deity, but must rather be 
seen as a more or less rationally conceived ar-
tifice (a political machine), designed by people 
for the purpose of their own self-preservation 
by way of its own self-preservation. After Hob-
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bes, rights no longer refer to the entitlements 
proper to different positions within a divinely 
ordained hierarchically differentiated social or-
der (STENNER, 2004). Instead, they come to 
be considered as the inalienable attributes of 
human beings as such, irrespective of one’s 
position or status in a given social order. The 
ultimate reason for society is self-referential 
and given in advance: the self-interested self-
-preservation of one-self.
Obviously Hobbes’ ideas went through in-
numerable challenges and modifications, but it 
was this transformed conception of basic, na-
tural or human rights (i.e. rights as grounded 
in a thoroughly instrumentalist account of hu-
man nature as it supposedly exists beyond and 
before society) that was to provide the basis, 
first for the great political revolutions in Ame-
rica and France, and thereafter, in principle at 
least, for practically all modern polities (a ri-
ghts-based constitution is the basic pattern of 
recognized nation states in the 21st century). 
Following the pattern established by Hobbes, 
the self-consciously scientific scrutiny of hu-
man affectivity comes to take place alongside 
a political project of founding and legitimating 
the social order: questions of political founda-
tion meet with ‘psychological’ answers concer-
ning affectivity. 
5 As we think, we live3
We began our argument with McEwan’s 
story about Beard’s encounter on a train and 
we used this anecdote to show how a funda-
mental assumption configures the significance 
of each moment of such an encounter. Much 
like Beard’s assumption, Tomkins’ instrumen-
3 WHITEHEAD, 1948, p. 148.
talist abstraction pervades his theory of affec-
tivity; if it turns out to be impoverished, then 
the lives lived on its basis will also be impove-
rished. In this concluding section we turn to 
examining some of its limitations, and point 
the way for a reframing of affectivity based 
on process thinking (see BROWN; STENNER, 
2009; STENNER, 2011). 
We propose that Tomkins’ account unfolds 
within the horizon set by Hobbes, where hu-
man nature is framed in terms of the impulse 
towards self-preservation. Although Tomkins’ 
concept of duplication is superficially different 
from that of self-preservation in that it points 
to a generative process (of further individuals), 
it nevertheless renders that creative process 
in fundamentally conservative terms. Self-pre-
servation and duplication alike imply more of 
the same rather than creative difference. Fur-
thermore: Hobbes’ Leviathan demonstrates the 
rational connection between vitality unders-
tood as an impulse towards self-preservation, 
and life lived according to the norms set by the 
polity. If this is how we understand human na-
ture, according to Hobbes, then it is irrational 
to do anything but subordinate our own will to 
that of the sovereign, and indeed we should 
fear the consequences of doing otherwise. In 
this sense, the logical conservatism implicit in 
the concept of self-preservation feeds into a 
form of political and ethical conservatism: the 
possibilities of our art of life are understood to 
coincide with those already set out by the Sta-
te within which we happen to live.
Georges Canguilhem (1958; 1992) argued 
that a similar conservatism is implicit, by de-
fault, in the ambition to provide a psychology 
understood as a ‘biology of human behaviour’. 
Modern scientific psychology, Canguilhem ar-
gues, defines itself as such by a refusal of all 
philosophical speculation on human nature 
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in favour of a general theory of the relations 
between organisms and their environment. A 
psychology conceived in this way, however, is 
unable to account for the ‘psychology of the 
psychologist’, that is, for the nature (and the 
motivations) of a being who seeks knowledge 
about itself. Modern psychology, in other wor-
ds, is specifically characterized by a ‘constitu-
tional incapacity’ to clearly articulate its own 
‘founding project’. The figure of the psycholo-
gist, devoid of any project that might derive 
from an idea of the values proper to the human 
qua human, finds an implicit raison d’etre in 
its social usefulness – in the extent to which 
it maximizes the utility of individuals, or faci-
litates their adaptation to the requirements of 
a social milieu. The psychologist, then, is the 
ultimate ‘instrument of the instrumentalisation 
of man’. A life thus ‘adapted’, however, is an 
impoverished life in so far as there is nothing 
necessary or inevitable about the norms of a 
social milieu. To quote Canguilhem:
The psychosocial definition of the normal in 
terms of adaptedness implies a concept of 
society which surreptitiously and wrongly as-
similates it to an environment, that is, to a 
system of determinisms when it is a system 
of constraints… To define abnormality in ter-
ms of social maladaptation is more or less 
to accept the idea that the individual must 
subscribe to the fact of such a society, hence 
must accommodate himself to it as a reality 
which is at the same time a good (1989, p. 
282-3).
Hobbes, of course, sought precisely to 
achieve this outcome whereby the individual 
subscribes to the simultaneous facticity and 
goodness of the social order, in the name of 
the tendency towards self-preservation as the 
most fundamental feature of life. For Cangui-
lhem, however, the fact of accepting and taking 
for granted the imposition of external norms 
is somewhat antithetical to the definition of a 
healthy, vital life. In fact, Canguihem’s utmost 
abstraction concerning living processes is quite 
the opposite: the chief characteristic of living 
beings is their normativity. Normativity is pre-
cisely not adaptation to imposed norms, but 
a relative creativity in the face of contradic-
tory norms; a tolerance of infractions of nor-
ms; and, most significantly, a forward thrus-
ting creative tendency to set one’s own norms 
(1992). 
A.N. Whitehead (1929/1958) adopts a simi-
lar position in criticising the limitations of the 
evolutionary doctrines of adaptation, struggle 
and survival - doctrines which echo the Hob-
besian emphasis on life as mere preservation 
in the face of fear, and Tomkins’ emphasis on 
mere duplication. For Whitehead, this conser-
vative stance can be maintained only by way of 
a studied ignorance of the creative aspects of 
evolution. ‘Why has the trend of evolution been 
upward?’ (1929/1958, p. 8), he asks, and how 
make sense of the fact that this upward trend 
is, if anything, accompanied by the converse 
relation whereby the more sophisticated ani-
mals progressively adapt the environment to 
themselves, and not vice versa? – ‘in the case 
of mankind this active attack on the environ-
ment is the most prominent fact in his existen-
ce’ (1929/1958, p. 8). In Whitehead’s philo-
sophy it is not duplication but creativity which 
holds pride of place as the utmost abstraction 
or ‘Category of the Ultimate’. Creativity is ‘the 
universal of universals characterizing ultimate 
matter of fact’ (1978, p. 21). When Whitehead 
(1929/1958, p. 8) discusses life, he invokes, 
not a technology, but an art of life: ‘a three-
-fold urge: (i) to live, (ii) to live well, (iii) to live 
better’. Whitehead makes an explicit contrast 
between the art of persistence and the art of 
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life. Life itself, he points out ‘is comparatively 
deficient in survival value. The art of persisten-
ce is to be dead. Only inorganic things persist 
for great lengths of time’ (1929/1958, p. 4). 
It is here that we can return to Tomkins’ 
unexamined distinction between non-living and 
living systems. The problem with this distinc-
tion, as seen from a Whiteheadian perspective, 
is that it retains the materialistic residues of 
the now outmoded first physical synthesis (see 
above). This synthesis involved the bifurcation 
of nature into a realm of purely material ob-
jectivity purged of subjectivity (i.e. affectivity, 
teleology, experience), and a realm of purely 
transcendent subjectivity, when what is requi-
red is a unified account of an inclusive imma-
nent totality. We say ‘residues’ because clearly 
Tomkins has moved beyond any crude version 
of this bifurcation by incorporating a theory of 
subjectivity into an account of living systems 
unified by the concept of duplication (consciou-
sness and affectivity are fully natural processes 
for Tomkins). Tomkins theory is certainly not 
materialistic in the crude sense that reality is 
ultimately made up of self-contained spatially 
related ‘bits of matter’. In fact, the concept of 
duplication places emphasis, not on materiality 
as such, but on process, since duplication is not 
a material entity but an activity. Nevertheless, 
the theory retains an unexamined bifurcation 
between the physical and the living, resting as 
it does upon an implicit concept of the physi-
cal world of non-living systems. This assumed 
physical substratum, it seems to us, continues 
to play the role of absolute underlying material 
reality. Hence in Tomkins’ account, affectivity, 
despite being granted a real existence as a de-
cisively important component in living human 
systems, is nevertheless something of a high-
-level epiphenomenon traceable to an origin 
that is, in the final analysis, purely material. 
Affects like fear, shame and joy are, in the fi-
nal analysis, nothing but perceptions derived 
from the operations of bodily functionings whi-
ch themselves have no affective dimension. As 
perceptions derived from organic activity they 
remain qualities of a subject, qualities that 
colour an otherwise colourless and affect-free 
material world with their distinctive aesthetic 
tones. Affectivity is not really a consequential 
part of the real world except to the extent that 
the colours that it projects onto the world mi-
ght change our conduct.
From a Whiteheadian perspective, these 
assumptions obscure any genuinely creative 
and transformative aspects of affectivity, and 
result in a weakened concept of affectivity un-
derstood as a mere quality of conscious expe-
rience superimposed upon a supposedly unfe-
eling substratum of duplicating machinery. The 
assumptions flow from a residual tendency to 
explain living phenomena in terms of what we 
think we know about non-living phenomena. In 
proposing a philosophy of organism Whitehe-
ad (1929, p. 19) reverses this tendency: ‘The 
problem set by the doctrine of evolution is to 
explain how complex organisms with deficient 
survival power ever evolved… Mankind has 
gradually developed from the lowliest forms of 
life, and must therefore be explained in terms 
applicable to all such forms. But why construe 
the later forms by analogy to the earlier forms? 
Why not reverse the process? It would seem 
to me more sensible, more truly empirical, to 
allow each living species to make its own con-
tribution to the demonstration of factors inhe-
rent in living things’. 
Rather than explaining the living by refe-
rence to the non-living, from this reversed 
perspective, all events, including those that 
make up the so-called ‘physical’ world, are 
duly conceived on the model of the organism. 
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The immanent principle of unity is that all exis-
tent reality is ‘composed of organisms endu-
ring through the flux of things’ (WHITEHEAD, 
1926/1985, p. 251). For Whitehead, rocks no 
less than rabbits are composed of a complex 
manifold of contemporary and ongoing events 
or ‘actual occasions’, such that the former may 
be referred to as lower types and the latter 
as higher types of organism. The difference is 
that the lower types are comparatively stable. 
Because the events that compose them are 
repetitive and conformal, they come to exhi-
bit a massive sameness. Tomkins’ concept of 
duplication is perfectly applicable to them, but 
not to the higher types whose enduring pat-
tern is more abstract and precarious. The hi-
gher types, for example, both presuppose and, 
to some extent, include the lower types within 
their structures. A living cell, for example, is 
a structured society of occasions that includes 
within it a multiplicity of subordinate societies 
composed of non-living molecules arranged in 
more or less intricate structural patterns. Life is 
thus characterized less by the securing of dupli-
cative survival than by what we (e.g.STENNER, 
2011, p. 55) call its in-securing. 
Affectivity within this way of thinking is not 
epiphenomenal but fundamental. The process 
of ‘duplication’ whereby the events composing 
the lower types of organism give rise repe-
titively to identical events is, for Whitehead, 
a process of conformal feeling. Feeling is not 
just an accompanying ‘quality’ but literally a 
process of grasping or prehension whereby an 
actual occasion/entity patterns the heteroge-
neous data of its actual world into a unity. Fe-
eling is this very process of creative synthesis, 
but in the case of the conformal feelings of lo-
wer organisms, novelty is at a mimimum, and 
hence physical events tend merely to repeat 
their precursors and contemporaries. Higher 
organisms, by contrast, trade the stability of 
mere survival for the heightened intensity of 
feeling made possible by complexity. The for-
mer live in the past, being determined by tra-
dition, the latter aim for an unrealized future 
as they clutch at the vivid immediacy of the 
present. 
Whitehead makes explicit his most gene-
ral assumption concerning affectivity when he 
writes that there is ‘nothing in the world which 
is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there 
for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt’. 
This general assumption makes affectivity, in 
the guise of feeling, an integral and decisively 
important aspect of nature - human and non-
-human, living and non-living, and, decisively, 
the site of the novelty of becoming: ‘each ac-
tual entity is conceived as an act of experience 
arising out of data. It is a process of “feeling” 
the many data… Here “feeling” is the term used 
for the basic generic operation of passing from 
the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of 
the actual entity in question. Feelings… effect… 
a transition into subjectivity.’ (WHITEHEAD, 
1927/8, p. 41). If feelings are operations which 
effect a transition from the objectivity of data 
to the subjectivity of the actual occasion in 
process of formation, then obviously this pro-
position entails a concept of affectivity that 
incorporates far more than the conscious ex-
perience of human beings, whilst nevertheless 
also including such experience as a type of hi-
gh-grade feeling. Feelings are always feelings 
of feelings past, and they always urge towards 
future feelings in the making. Feelings become 
conscious feelings only in the context of the 
later phases of experience of very complex hi-
gh-grade organisms. These later phases build 
upon and develop (i.e. feel) a veritable cas-
cade of unconscious experiences grounded in 
physiological activity, even as they build upon 
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and develop (i.e. feel) the conscious experien-
ce, now spent, of a moment before. 
Returning to the example from our novel, 
McEwan tells us that Beard experienced a flash 
of heightened consciousness on discovering 
the packet of crisps in his jacket pocket. As 
we draw to our conclusion, it is worth dwelling 
briefly on this fleeting event. Beard’s flash of 
consciousness, writes McEwan, ‘felt like libera-
tion, strangely like joy’ (2010, p. 127). It was, 
in other words, a flash of affectivity, illustrating 
how consciousness develops from the feeling 
of something that matters, a significant con-
trast or difference. Without denying a place 
for stability and repetition, we hope to have 
contributed to a similar contrast, a certain lib-
eration of the concept of affectivity from the 
strictures of instrumentalism.
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